

OVIDIUS UNIVERSITY OF CONSTANȚA
DOCTORAL SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES
DOCTORAL FIELD: HISTORY

ABSTRACT

THE EVOLUTON OF THE ROMANIAN NAVY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ITS LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP (1877- 1944)

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CONSTANȚA

2022

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Key words: Military Leadership; Navy; Naval History; World War I; World War II

The History of the Romanian Navy, under its many names (The Flotilla Corps, Navy, Romanian Royal Navy) was marked by the historical contexts of its development. Another factor however was the leadership, the personalities of its elite. The officer corps, from where those figures came, was studied too lightly so far. This fact is also true in the cases of larger navies, whose studies came only in the last decades.

The importance of the training and specialization of the officers was accepted early on by the Romanian political elite. Once the Navy became a so-called „special weapon”, the selection and training procedures for the young officers ensured a high standard of professionalism.

It is quite difficult to assess the importance of the Naval elite without first understanding the organization itself. The officers were and still are just a piece of the whole. This is why the leadership studies are quite significant. To see the whole picture of the officer corps, it is clear we need to get a full view of the Navy itself, with its own characteristics.

The evolution of the Romanian Navy started with the unification of the small flotillas of Walachia and Moldavia, in 1860. This is when the Flotilla Corps, the first name of the Navy. Its first years were marked by a steady development, without major success. Ship acquisitions, both fighting vessels and training ones, were quite rare. The Independence War (1877-1878) proved to be an important landmark, not only for Romania, but also for its Navy. It was the first time the Navy was used with missions ranging from laying mine barrages, torpedo attacks and securing bridges across the Danube. It was clear that the Army needed naval support in any actions near the river.

The next period, until the end of the Nineteenth Century saw an accelerated endowment with different types of new ships. There were also the first regulations for the naval training. The legislation was adapted for the increasing needs of the service. During those years the development of the Navy went hand in hand with the increases in commercial ship numbers, with significant advantages for both sides. The Navy benefited from the investments in the

shipping facilities. Also, the commercial ships could be used for the training of the servicemen. Meanwhile, the commercial fleet could count on specialized crews from the military side.

The Navy had a small number of officers due to its size, but in its first stages it benefited from the services of some exceptional personalities, some of them even reaching the higher echelons of its structure. We have selected for our thesis the two „founders” of the Romanian Navy – Nicolae Dumitrescu Maican and Ioan Murgescu. They both lobbied for a constant increase in funding for the Navy and also for an expansion of its size. The two officers understood early on that if Romania wanted to join the wide world, it needed a commercial fleet and a Navy to defend its shipping lanes.

At its earlier stages, the development of the modern Romanian Navy involved the acquisition of new ships, since the ones in service in 1860 were quite obsolete. The political and military circles wanted a strong Romanian presence on the Danube. The other component of the naval force, the so-called „moral dimension”, which is to say its personnel, proved to be difficult to create and expand. It takes time and money to train and gel the crews of ships and Romania had scarce resources. It also lacked specialized instructors and the only solution in the long term was to send young Romanian officers abroad for specialization.

The next period in the history of the Romanian Navy was from the start of the Twentieth Century until the end of World War I. This period offered the chance to participate in two major military conflicts, very important for the history of Romania: The Second Balkan War and World War I. Under the leadership of admirals Emanoil Koslinski, Sebastian Eustațiu and Constantin Bălescu, the Navy progressed significantly both in the number of ships, and in the training of their crews. After the Navy became an autonomous service, which we can trace back to 1898, there was naturally a phase of consolidation, to get it ready for the inevitable conflicts to come.

The task of the new commanders was to continue the structural strengthening of the service and to develop better training programs for the newer generations of officers. The latter was quite a success: Nicolae Negrescu, Vasile Scodrea or Petre Bărbuneanu, to name just a few naval officers that distinguished themselves in 1916-1919, were trained during the first decade of the Twentieth Century.

In the years of the War of National Unification (1916-1919), as Romanians call World War I, the Navy contributed to the general war effort with numerous combat missions such as the defense of the bridgehead at Turtucaia or the support for the right flank of the armies in Dobruja.

After the war however, the matter of the training for the naval elite was different. Romania achieved its dream of unifying all of its historical provinces in 1918 and had increasingly larger resources to invest in its Navy, slowly buying new types of warships like destroyers, submarines and minelayers.

These all transformed the small, mostly river based Navy in a new and modern structure, with a balanced approach to strategical planning. , the need for well-trained and specialized officers remained. The larger naval conflicts in the West offered valuable lessons and ideas, but one cardinal truth persisted: the Navy required an increasingly larger number of good officers. This is why the leaders of the interwar Romanian Navy focused heavily on developing the training system for the newer generations. The biggest achievement was, without doubt, the creation of the Naval School, in 1920, the first such institution in the history of the country.

We cannot fully determine the extent with which the naval lobby influenced the ship acquisitions, but we can say for sure that on the matter of the structure of the Navy and the formation of the fleet their expertise was heard. Interwar naval officers raised the tactical level to new heights and themselves were highly trained professionals. Proof of that are the countless articles and conferences on the subject of naval warfare. Another matter was the ongoing dispute between two schools of thought that went on almost until World War II. One group argued for the classical approach, of a mostly surface fleet, while the other wanted new weapon systems like submarines and naval air power. Through this intellectual dispute, the Romanian naval officers were connected to the larger current of ideas emanating from the Western navies.

During World War II, the Navy again participated against a much stronger adversary. The most important naval clash took place in the first days of the war, on June 26 1941, when the coastal batteries drove the Russian warships attacking the city of Constanța into the minefields there. „Moskva” sunk and another destroyer was damaged. After that the Romanian Navy had other missions to perform: anti-submarine warfare and escort duty for the important supply convoys in the Black Sea. In 1944 it had to execute a very difficult evacuation of the Crimea, an operation in which Rear Admiral Macellariu distinguished himself. On the Danube side of the battlefield, most of the fighting took place in the first two months of the war.

Another important moment came after August 23 1944, when Romania switched sides and joined the Allies against Germany. On the coast of the Black Sea this put its fleet at odds

with the German forces in Constanța. Only through the leadership skills of Rear Admiral Macellariu a violent confrontation was avoided.

It's clear then that throughout the interwar years the morale of the naval officers was very important and impacted the performances of the junior ranks, NCOs and the enlisted men. There is no doubt there were times when it seemed the Navy was badly led. Studying the military memoirs of the officers, one can see that egos were sometimes inflated and conflicts could happen even at the highest echelon.

Still, we must not forget that leadership studies is not exactly a precise science. Even flamboyant leaders such as Constantin Bălescu or Vasile Scodrea were able to put aside their egos and train excellent and talented officers. The examples are countless: Alexandru Gheorghiu, Eugeniu Roșca and of course Horia Macellariu grew under the supervision of controversial naval commanders that proved to be also good instructors.

Our thesis, called „The evolution of the Romanian Navy from the perspective of its leaders and leadership (1877-1944)” has its main goal set to clarify the role the naval leaders played in its development, from the Independence War to the end of the operations in the Black Sea, during World War II. It is an ambitious objective to be sure, and it requires identifying the characteristics of a naval leader and analysing how it worked for the Romanian Navy. Moreover, such an enterprise in the field of naval military means identifying the differences from the much larger leadership elements of the land forces. A recurrent theme in our thesis is the training process for the officers. Leadership is known to some as the art of interacting with the others, to act in their name, show empathy, but at the same time be determined and press for results. For the naval side of the matter, some nuances must be taken into account. On his ship, the naval officer must be a model to be sure, like his Army counterpart, but somewhat paradoxical, he is closer to his subordinates and farther at the same time. Naval leaders and their men are often isolated on their ships, sharing similar dangers. These are the particular aspects of naval leadership we have tried to illustrate.

Achieving our main goal forced us to resort to some secondary directions of study, such as:

- the exemplification of the different naval units in the history of Romania, with their names and duties. We also had to see what naval leaders distinguished themselves in those times;

- pointing out the activity of the naval leaders in the context of the broader picture of the Romanian military system. They strove to obtain the much-needed funds and influence for the development of the Navy;
- a detailed analysis of the training and specialization system for the naval officers. A constant of our work is the study of the naval training institutions of the Romanian Navy, beginning with the earlier, more empirical schools and culminating with the Naval School of 1920;
- the presentation of the strategic thought process and the doctrines emanating from this, in regards with the naval commanders of the Romanian Navy. These concepts were refined through the lessons learned in the Independence War, the Balkan War and during the two World Wars. The entire process of assimilating different ideas and transforming them into coherent doctrines was an integral part of the leadership transfer between the generations of officers;
- identifying the particularities of the leaders we looked into in an attempt to determine what type of leaders they were;
- we also had to show in detail the international context of the activity of those naval leaders since some events abroad influenced developments in the country, especially concerning the naval programs;
- we couldn't ignore the human side of the military activity. Some leaders, of a more temperamental nature, caused serious contradictions, sometimes at the very summit of the service.

The motivation for such a subject – the history of the Romanian Navy from the perspective of its leadership was driven by the lack of such studies in Romania. Until now we had many studies on a broad subject like the history of the Navy. The sheer size of the subject forced the authors to take a general stance on things like the motivation and particularities of the commanders. Our bibliography shows that our thesis is the first one that is focused on the specific contributions of the leaders for the expansion of the Navy.

We think it's axiomatic that without the contribution of the naval elite, well trained scientifically, militarily and technically, the Romanian Navy couldn't have had such a remarkable evolution. Even though it was a smaller service than the Army, it had a pronounced technical aspect to it. This is why it required highly specialized officers in all of its fields. We argue that this is why the role of the naval officer was more important than his Army counterpart.

Our task was firstly to clarify exactly to what the contribution of these people amounted to, from 1877 to the critical period of World War II. Naval planners were involved in sensible activities such as shipbuilding programs and strategical directives. In the almost total absence of testimonies, especially for the earlier times, we had to rely on some suppositions to deduce the relations between officers from different generations.

Based on this bibliography we have structured the thesis on five chapters, from the genesis of the modern Romanian Navy until the end of World War II.

From 1877 to 1944 the Romanian Navy had eleven commanders. Among them we chose those we think had the largest impact of this history. Although no person can have a pure leadership style, we strove to put those we chose in a specific category. The first chapter, that serves as an introduction, we used most of our elements of interdisciplinarity. We focused there on the definition of the term “leadership”, especially in the field of the military. The chapter moves on after that towards the specifics of the naval leadership, which has a common ground with its Army counterpart, but at the same time has many particularities.

This first chapter makes a parallel with the stronger navies in the West. Their training and specialization systems were rudimentary at first, but, critically, they had a way of transmitting knowledge from generation to generation. Then we move on to the similar system of Romania that benefited from these examples and adapted them for the national system. Although it could be considered too ambitious, some comparison between these systems is warranted and proved to be a useful exercise. We could see some relevant similarities with the methodologies of the British and the French in regards to leadership teaching systems and practical issues.

The history of the naval training system, not only for the officers, depended largely on its resources. This is why a system needed to be put in place right from the start, by the earlier Flotilla Corps of Romania. After the Independence War of 1877-1878, the solution it resorted to was to send its young and talented officers abroad, to study in the prestigious Western naval academies. Vice Admiral Bălescu went to Brest, just like admirals Dumitrescu-Maican and Murgescu; Petre Bărbuneanu went to Fiume and Petre Demetriade to France.

This was followed by the acquisition of a specialised school-ship for the elementary school of the Navy. The brig “Mircea” entered service in 1882. For a long time, it was the means by which young sailors were introduced with their new home. The ship went on many cruises in

the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Until 1926 it had 17 missions in the former and 12 in the latter, with another 2 in the Atlantic.

We can see the beginnings of a portrait for the typical Romanian naval officer. Until 1896, when the Navy created a Specialization School for Junior Lieutenants, he was a graduate from the Army's military schools. Some of them came from the Naval Elementary School (that typically enlisted orphans from military families). For the latter this was a clear advantage. Before 1896 the officers came from different branches: Infantry, Artillery and Engineers. This is why there was a distinct inefficiency when it came to leading warships in difficult training sessions. The first generations of naval officers often lacked even the most basic experience in naval matters.

This is why they were forced to navigate "troubled waters" and put together the bricks of the foundation for the Navy. It is remarkable that this process was completed on the go, creating a new service in a relative short period of time. One example of this were the naval plans, from 1859 until World War II, two of them being very important – the one of 1880 and the one of 1907. Choosing the ship types and their number was always going to be a controversial topic, but when they were implemented, it was almost without problems, serving the best interests of the coastal defense.

The first naval program was decided under the impact of the Independence War and then need to create a nucleus for the Navy on the seaside as well. For the first time, the naval elite was tasked with a maritime dimension of their activity, with a much larger scale than their previous river endeavors. The ships bought between 1880 and 1888 were tasked with the mission of projecting Romanian naval power in the Black Sea, but they also had to be training vessels. The next ship program, in 1907, was a similar project. It was meant to secure the river border by means of river monitors from the "Brătianu" class and torpedo boats. The next logical step, to strengthen the Sea Division, was postponed and had to wait the end of World War I to see fruition.

The next programs were in the interwar period, in the new geopolitical context after the Unification of 1918. It is understandable then that those plans were quite ambitious and, in fact, unattainable. The practice then was to demand for as much ships and planes knowing that the political authorities would discard most of them. The ships that were actually bought were the bare minimum needed.

This is why when analyzing the Romanian naval elite, from the Flotilla Corps to the end of World War II, we notice that all these leaders had a dual nature: military leaders and administrators. Since the Navy remained a small service, leaders like Nicolae Dumitrescu-Maican, Ioan Murgescu, Nicolae Negrescu, Constantin Bălescu, Vasile Scodrea, Eugeniu Roșca or Horia Macellariu alternated between sea commissions and land-based jobs. In the first period of the modern Romanian Navy, Maican was moved from the head of the Naval Command to lead some artillery units in the Independence War. Similarly, Murgescu led a formation of auxiliary vessels during the war. Before that, he took part in the daring raid at Macin, an important episode of that naval war. Vice Admiral Scodrea was the Chief of the Operational Fleet during World War and, later on, Vice Admiral Roșca led the entire Navy from the front lines in the Danube sector in 1941.

The mentality of the officer corps of the Navy was evolving quickly, especially since the end of the Twentieth Century, moving towards a “classical” approach in regards to the training and development of the naval officer. There were however some important influences of French origins, tendencies towards the concepts of the “Jeune Ecole”. These tendencies caused those conflicts between the two sides, one lobbying for the submarine and the other one in favor of a more traditional approach.

After World War I the Navy was led by proponents of the dominance of heavy artillery on big ships. This current had its roots in the lessons they learned during their studies in Italy mostly. The Italian fleet seemed like a good model for the small Romanian Navy: a fledgling regional power, asserting its influence with naval power. This new view was expressed in the naval acquisitions of the 20`s and the 30`s, with Romania acquiring four destroyers, four gunboats, a minelayer and just one submarine.

The Second Chapter, called *The Founders of the Romanian Navy* focuses on the analysis of pioneering work of the first important naval officers of Romania: General Nicolae-Dumitrescu Maican and Vice Admiral Ioan Murgescu. The starting point of our analysis is the first steps taken in the 1860`s, to create this new naval service for the Army. An interesing aspect in this regard is to see what kinda of leadership traits these two leaders possesed and if and how they were passed on to their succesors.

As for the type of leadership they employed, although they are difficult to asses, it is clear they showed many qualities deemed necessary for a leader of the Nineteenth Century:

determination, perseverance and vision. Still, we have to asses that they mostly fit into the transactional style. This is understandable since this type of leadership is characterized by formalism, reward and punishments for the subordinates, depending on their performances. Dumitrescu-Maican and Murgescu were establishing a new organisation in many senses and this is why they had to impose the standards of gravitas and rigour. Their fame as inspirational leaders is always normal, because they were the first leaders and they influenced all the other generations as role models. Murgescu's command was a slow transition towards a inspirational/transformational style of leadership, with a higher degree of delegation which allowed the young officers to gain more experience and become better leaders.

We were keen comparing these results with those of the larger navies in the West in their incipient stages, but we wanted to keep the specifics of the Romanian Navy as a major point of the thesis.

Romania's new maritime litoral, obtained after the Independence War, offered new and intriguing possibilities for economic development, but it also meant that the country needed fresh sea forces to defend the coastline. In this regard the political and military elites of Romania understood the need for some investments in the Navy.

At the same time the contributions of the naval elite, spearheaded by the topmost commanders, Dumitrescu-Maican and Murgescu, was fundamental for the increase in prestige and status for the Navy going forward. The mission before them was difficult, however. On the one hand, the service was quite small and the resources allocated were correspondingly minor, in favour of the more traditional services like Infantry, Artillery or Engineers. On the other hand, they wanted the Navy to be more autonomous in the military establishment. Until then, it was serviced in the War Ministry by the Artillery Directorate and then by the Engineer one, which shows its small importance thus far.

All the successive achievements, both in the endowment in new ships and in the realm of administration and organization needed financial investments. The results, as they were in the period after the Independence War, seemed impossible only years before. In 1880 the Navy could boast only four ships, old and technically inferior. Gradually, through a series of ship buying programs, in 1900 it had 28 ships.

In the field of organization and legislation the progress was huge. Both leaders insisted for the demarcation of the Navy from the other services. This was considered necessary because

the Navy was a distinct service and it needed its own resources. The first important moment in this field was the creation of the Flotilla Law in 1886, just eight years after the Independence War. This law accepted the concept of unicity for the Navy as a support service for the land forces. For the first time there was a clarification of the missions it would undertake, which would remain virtually unchanged for decades to come.

Ten years later came the Decree no. 1093, for the organization of the Flotilla, this time the brainchild of Murgescu. This new law divided the responsibilities between two geographical divisions. Before that it was common practice to form training divisions on the river and in the Black Sea and these would become permanent, administrative units.

The high point in the legislative evolution for the Romanian Navy came in 1898, when a new special law for the organization of the Navy was promulgated. This new law was highly influenced by the naval elite, especially Murgescu, but it also kept the principles laid out in 1886. It stood the test of time and it determined the fate of the Navy for almost four decades.

The third chapter is dedicated to the first generation that came after the “Founders”. This was a period of transition and also consolidation of the gains from the previous generation. The first period was quite a short one and the need to quickly build a new service took its toll on the naval elite. All the building blocks were laid without time enough to develop each one in part.

Only at the start of the Twentieth Century we have a coagulation of a true naval policy which was reflected in the naval program of 1907. This new plan was centered on the consolidation of the river defense and ignored the maritime forces. This new period in the history of the Navy, between 1901 and the end of the First World War was determined by the baptism of fire in the war. That was the time when all of the achievements were tested and a new project began: the creation of a maritime fleet.

At the same time, on the river side of the Navy, the period before World War I was also the period when the Danube Division enjoyed its dominance over the Sea Division. The fact that the naval elite anticipated that the main effort in the war will have to be on the river was another proof of their sound strategic thinking. This is why in 1907 they insisted on the strengthening of the Danube Division. The 1907 planning and ship building program was the first attempt at creating a true naval policy, with long term implication both on the performances of the Navy and its prospects after the war ended.

The naval leaders of 1901-1919 had the difficult task of transitioning from a structure with obsolete vessels, bought at the end of the Nineteenth Century, to a more modern force, with new and challenging missions.

Like their predecessors, Koslinski, Eustațiu and Bălescu had to adapt and divide their attention on both the training programs and their constant struggle for financial resources for new ships. The distinction between them and the former generation, was that the “founders” had the advantage of the element of novelty for the Navy. It was a new service, with a certain appeal and intrigue that garnered favor from the authorities. Unlike them, the new generation after 1900 was confronted by the perspective of an imminent worldwide conflict against a far superior alliance. Meanwhile, the budgetary allowances still reflected the status of a developing Navy.

Koslinski proved in his eight years of “tenure” at the head of the Navy that he had qualities consistent with *strategic leadership*, this being the reason why we used this expression for his section. A strategic leader is mostly found at the upper echelons of the Army. To be efficient he must act with ease in the higher circles of the state apparatus. It stands to reason that *strategic leadership* must be characterized by the ability to plan on the long term and to ensure the cooperation between different elements of the armed forces. Koslinski’s decision to focus all of the Navy’s resources available for the 1907 program on the development of the Danube Division, to support the land forces, is consistent with *strategic leadership*.

The next two admirals we looked on, Eustațiu and Bălescu were a throwback to the older styles, of classical, *transactional leadership*. There were some *transformational* elements here as well and even *institutional* ones especially in the case of Bălescu. This type of leadership enhances the institutional building blocks of the organization and creates an organizational culture. Bălescu’s contribution in the development of the education system for the Navy is significant. He was the first director for the Practical School for the Naval Junior Lieutenants and then for the Navy Schools.

The 1901-1909 period was one of consolidating the gains of the last decades of the Nineteenth Century. That was the time when the service was received its legislative foundation, that respected its different needs and characteristics than those of the land forces. If we state that between 1877 and 1901 the Navy achieved its foundations, then it is clear that the new generation of naval leaders expanded its influence and importance.

The first two commanders of the Navy, Nicolae Dumitrescu-Maican and Ioan Murgescu were atypical naval officers in a way, because they were forced to navigate uncharted waters and fight to achieve the respect the Navy deserved. From other points of view however, they represented the archetype of the naval officer of the Nineteenth Century, of warrior-leader, both with a rich experience of combat during the Independence War. The complex system they created necessitated the emergence of a different type of naval leader, with distinct skills and views and ultimately with a new vision on the role of the Navy in the larger Romanian Army.

We would be wrong if we would judge the performances of the Navy from the start of the century to the end of World War I just through their results during the war. The contributions of the Navy must be an important factor in the final analysis, but we mustn't forget that although the command of a force belongs to the elite (naval officers), the implementation of orders comes down to the junior grades. Therefore, the results depend on the subordinates as well and also on other intermediary factors. Often military leadership is judged only on the palpable results compared to the initial expectations and the failures are harshly criticized.

From this standpoint the performances of the Romanian Navy in the test of the war were quite modest. But looking at the larger picture and taking into consideration the variables of economical, social and military power of the combatants, we can propose a more nuanced idea.

These three naval leaders had at their disposal only slightly larger budgets than the previous ones had, so any investment had to be well thought out. Choosing the Danube Division as the focal point for the investments proved to be a wise decision. The Romanian naval elite recognized that its role would be to check the Central Powers on the river and to dominate an inferior adversary, like the small Bulgarian Navy. Even against the might of the Austro-Hungarian flotilla, the force of a large empire, as Rear Admiral Negrescu described it, the Navy could offer a stiff resistance thanks to the ships it bought in 1907. In this way it would slow down the enemy's offensive. It is not difficult to imagine what would have happened on the Romanian Southern Front, if the Navy didn't have the monitors and the torpedo boats to prevent the river crossings from Bulgaria or from occupied Dobruja.

From other perspectives as well, we can say that the interval 1901-1901 was fruitful. Another factor that determines naval success is the connection between the Navy and the political culture of the nation, that is to say the naval traditions or the affinity for sailing activities. There is no doubt that in this sector there were remarkable achievements. For one, the

connection between the Navy and the commercial fleet and its two state owned companies was constant. Then we have the establishment of military harbor masters in all of the ports. Moreover, the Navy had a true identity in the Army. These factors proved to be essential in forming a positive reaction in the society towards the Navy.

The Fourth Chapter follows the exploits of the naval commanders in the Interwar period, strong personalities, forged in war and determined to implement a much larger naval strategy than before.

We show as well that the upward trajectory of the Navy in the 20's and the 30's was not a coincidence. Even if the resources available were significantly more consistent, the achievements in all of the areas of naval power (ships, training, and infrastructure) were too big to be explained by just more money. Those decades were the time when some of the contradictions brewing in the officer corps, seemingly purely "ideological" in nature were exacerbated and they threatened to destroy the prestige of the entire service. Although the sides were arguing about naval strategy and fleet compositions, this was just one pretext.

The first chief of the Navy in those times, Rear Admiral Niculescu-Rizea, was a clear example of what we call "visionary leadership" for the Romanian Navy.

His vision was one of a "revolutionary" Navy, with small surface craft and a focus on submarines, naval airpower and coastal artillery defenses. A visionary leader must have the capacity to convince his subordinates to follow his lead for the creation of said vision. Even if Niculescu-Rizea's efforts were met with resistance from the more conservative camp in the Navy, which wanted a classical fleet composition, he was open to dialog and made significant efforts to find a common ground.

Vice Admiral Vasile Scodrea was the one that had the most contributions on the institutional development of the Navy in all of its history up until he took over, in 1925. As his predecessor, Scodrea had a remarkable capacity to compromise and he was able to reconnect the Navy to its traditional values. This way he could develop the naval ethos of Romania.

On the other hand, he benefited from a unity of command not afforded to some of the previous naval leaders. In 1926, the Naval Command became the Naval General Inspectorate, a new command structure. Scodrea managed to use this new unity in the naval officer corps to fulfil his goals. This newly found unity of command had the benefit of obtaining a coordination of the efforts of all the members of the leadership, for a common purpose that could only be the

development of the organization. Scodrea's achievements were remarkable in this regard. The Sea Division was practically transformed during his command and the whole Navy as a service became a superior force compared to the previous period.

The preparation of the Navy for the Second World War was the main responsibility of Admiral Petre Bărbuneanu, who represented a different kind of commander and another type of leadership. The subchapter dedicated to his tenure at the head of the Navy proved that a transformational leader must not necessarily be a flashy personality with exuberant actions in order to inspire just as much. We have called his unique type of command style as *technical leadership*, because the leader focuses on the palpable results and planning excellent training programs, compensating his apparent lack of charisma with competence. "Technical" leaders excel in a specific area of their field and are generally working much more than other types, always acting with a superior degree of professionalism. This is why they are ardent supporters of perfectionism for themselves, and for their subordinates, setting high standards for both.

On a general level, the situation of the Romanian Navy in 1919 was undoubtedly negative. Alongside its problems with supplying the most basic materials, the technical state of the main warships was worrying. Moreover, as to increase the strain on its limited resources, the defense tasks now included the protection of the Bessarabia coastline and the land to the south, recaptured from the Bulgarians.

The challenges that the naval leaders had to contend with were very different, not just from an organizational perspective, but when it came to morale as well. What was needed was a sort of rehabilitation of the leader role in the Navy, as an important service in the Army. It became quickly clear that the existent naval officer profile, which served it well enough until World War I, needed a revision. On the one hand, the Navy needed to reform according to the new, more modern, principles. This meant that its leaders needed special managerial skills to overcome the numerous hurdles that they would encounter in their active service on the ships and even in the land based naval units. Every command required leadership skills, but the naval officers of that time were facing logistical problems unheard before and the naval academies did not prepare them for that.

We can speculate with a certain degree of certainty that at least in the first years after the Great War, the Navy was searching for the proper forms, while its fond was changing rapidly.

On the other hand, while the Navy's obligations were increasing, the social and economic conditions of the countries were deteriorating. This, of course, made it impossible to get its ship requirements, as demanded in the naval programs. The naval leadership of Romania, even from its incipience and in the Interwar years, had to contend with a tense international situation. Romania was encircled by a number of unfriendly states with territorial demands. This instability on the external scene was reflected in the country's military institutional paradigm.

It is unquestionable that the progresses of the Navy, even in this time of duress, while being led by admirals Niculescu-Rizea and Scodrea, were considerable. The latter even said in a memo, in 1931, speaking about the achievements of the naval leadership that: the Navy had to evolve after the end of the war in a way that had no comparison in the history of Romania. Even if the author of the memo could be considered partial, it is a fact that the Romanian Navy did not possess a single seaworthy ship in 1919. The Sea Division was simply an administrative unit, a nucleus for the future expansion of the force.

The Romanian Navy had focused all of its efforts since the start of the Twentieth Century on the expansion of the Danube Division. There it had its main warships – four river monitors and seven torpedo boats, the result of the last complete naval program, of 1907.

Slowly, there were some results on that front as well, and the best indicator of these was the rapid increase in the number of naval officers, trained between 1926 and 1931, more than 100 plus 16 mechanical officers. Alongside them, 127 petty officers were commissioned in some of the most needed specializations – mining, torpedoes, naval constructions etc.

The last chapter has two major components: crisis leadership, which, when it comes to the Romanian Navy, is represented in our opinion by Rear Admiral Eugeniu Roșca. In many different studies on the subject of leadership, there is a clear distinction between crisis management and crisis leadership. The former concentrates on the exact steps one must follow in a crisis to overcome it. The latter, on the other hand, looks at the long-term lessons that are drawn after analyzing those steps, the management of a difficult spot. It also follows the ways in which a leader might prepare his organization to cope with the key moments in an efficient manner.

One can hardly imagine a more difficult scenario than the one that Romania faced in the autumn of 1940, when Roșca took over the command of its Navy. After the territorial losses in that summer and the ongoing process of reorganizing the Army that followed, there was still the

problem of defending the maritime coasts. In addition, the loss of Bessarabia meant that the Soviets were back on the Danube, bringing more and more troops and ships at the new borders.

In these circumstances, Roșca's mission was a tough one and required superhuman efforts and arduous activity to revitalize the demoralized Navy. However, it paid off. The Navy's participation in the Eastern Campaign (1941-1944) did not disappoint, largely because of its excellent leadership in those years of crisis.

The role of the Navy in the Second World War depended to a high degree on its place in the Romanian Armed Forces, as decided by the General Staff and on the missions issued for it. There was the discrepancy of power between the Romanian fleet and its Soviet adversary in the designated battlefield area, which had its huge impact on the naval developments during 1941-1944. It is understandable why the Romanian Navy opted for a defensive posture throughout the war, especially since there was no prospect of an allied fleet coming to its support. Only at the end of the 30's there were significant investments in the development of the Navy, when it was clear that the war was unavoidable.

Under these circumstances it would be excusable to think that the Navy's leadership could influence in a very limited manner its development before the war, and the situation on the battlefield once battle was joined. However, high-ranking officers, transformational leaders that inspired their men, like Roșca and superior tacticians, like Macellariu, were forced to make do in a situation of numerical inferiority and with often-obsolete equipment.

Still, from a doctrine standpoint, Romania was surprisingly well equipped to handle the enemy forces, even if we take into account the financial limitations. In this regard, it was the merit of its leadership that the Navy was able to keep pace with the tactical innovations of the West. Even if it did not have a true naval doctrine per say, the intellectual creations in the field of naval tactics and strategy were remarkable and even comparable to those in the West. Many factors contributed to the high standard of the debates and discussions among the naval elite. The most important was, in our opinion, the amplitude of the Naval School. While it is true that, in the absence of serious investments, most of the talks were without result, the superior training of the officer corps could account for some of the victories against the Soviets.

The naval campaign of 1941 in the Black Sea stands as a shining example of choosing the best strategy and allocating the scarce resources accordingly. The Romanian naval forces were used with competence and economy. Rear Admiral Roșca ensured that the naval leadership was

up to par with the requirement during those times of stress. He proved that good results come when professional competence meets qualities representative of inspirational leadership.

The last section focuses on the activity of Rear Admiral H. Macellariu, who is often considered the most important officer in the war against the U.S.S.R. A strong personality and still a moderate officer, Macellariu embodied all the attributes of the efficient naval officer in the Twentieth Century. He showed those qualities both as a general staff planner and as a commander, while leading the Destroyer Squadron and then the larger Maritime Force into battle.

As we follow the trajectory of his career, culminating with the Second World War, we can see that he was the embodiment of the transformational leadership, with a tragic destiny, unfortunately.

Starting with the first winter of the war (1941-1942), the fate of the campaign, at least for the Southern part of the front, depended on a much larger scale than anticipated on the protection of the transport convoys. This protection was ensured by the Romanian fleet, led with skill by Macellariu.

At the head of the Destroyer Squadron and then of the Maritime Force, he was able to exploit the conditions of the battlefield to Romania's advantage and use the characteristics of an interior sea to adapt the missions that include minelaying, escort and minesweeping.

Overall, the Romanian Navy passed the test of war, all the while remaining the third service of the armed forces when it comes to men and materiel. One key for these good results was the protection of the lines of communications. According to many specialists, this was vital, since the enemy was not able to sever the transport routes on the Western coasts of the Black Sea even though it had dozens of submarines. One could argue that in these tough conditions, the Romanian naval officer corps demonstrated special leadership skills. The best argument for that? The Romanian fleet suffered no significant loss and even managed to sink many enemy vessels.

Our attempt to reach the designed objectives must be accompanied by our conviction that the thesis is by no means complete. Not only in the case of the vision of the work itself, but when it comes to the thoroughness of some of the research directions, we feel that new ideas and thoughts could better illustrate our point. After all, any historical discourse is subject to interpretation. We also think that confronting our hypothesis with the interested reader, historian or simply interested in the Romanian Navy, would augment our work.

